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My memory keeps getting in the way of your history. 
(Agha Shahid Ali) 
Prelude 
Bangladesh is turning fifty in 2021. The history of genocide by the Pakistani 
army and their collaborators against Bengalis in 1971 has been passed 
down across generations—narratives of trauma, loss and triumph that 
continue to shape our imaginations today. Of course, many of us did not 
experience the war ourselves, but we did witness the birth and death of 
Shahabag—watched it unfold from the ground, soaking in the spirit of the 
collective. This was the euphoria that gripped the nation-state in February 
2013—Dhaka city pulsating with chants of 'phashi chai' ('hang them now'), 
and huge red posters with white skinny fists covering the billboards, 
challenging the state and judiciary and demanding that the war criminals 
of 1971 be hanged. Generations who had not experienced the trauma of 
war themselves were enthralled by the magic of nationalism, a magic that 
even as it unified some, also vilified "others". 
Movements and uprisings are typically taken as responses to history and 






as much about the unanswered questions it posed. The movement 
demanded a hasty closure to the unresolved wounds of 1971, aspiring for 
a new beginning without questioning the nationalist history of the Liber-
ation War that has been handed down to us as canon. In the process, the 
hope for a new radical politics that it had rekindled was immediately snuffed 
out, leaving behind despair, desolation, and unanswered questions. Had a 
truly "inclusive" nation-state ever been possible? 
This article is an exploration of some of these questions. They are posed, 
I argue, because of the "loopholes" in the canonical narratives of the 
nation’s history, loopholes I explore by turning instead to memory and the 
lived experiences of the nation-state at its "margins", in the small, multi-
ethnic, post-colonial town of Saidpur. By connecting two very different 
moments in history and juxtaposing "centre" and "periphery", I look at 
multiple and conflicting discourses on 1971 in the making and the patterns 
of what is remembered and forgotten. I look at how personal memories of 
trauma and abandonment have become subsumed under the meta-narra-
tives of 1971. Such narratives are always mediated and perpetually curated 
in response to changing historical and material conditions, class aspirations 
and the interests of different ruling regimes. The remembering of certain 
histories and forgetting of others is, I argue, a deeply political act. Despite 
dramatic shifts in both regimes and narratives, certain omissions have been 
universal to all. 
I propose that by restraining the histories of violence against the nation’s 
multiple "others", a simplistic, "valiant" narrative of 1971 has emerged that 
has enabled an exclusionary and intolerant Bengali nationalism that 
legitimises certain hierarchies and makes certain lives invisible. At the same 
time, critiques of such narratives have tended to ignore the concrete his-
torical conditions in which they emerged and the popular aspirations they 
carried, thereby unintentionally replacing the simplified narratives of valour 
with ones of victimhood, ignoring the mutual, collective culpability of war 
and post-colonial violence. The paper thus aims at both a critical revisioning 
of the nationalist narratives of 1971, by exploring the contradictory and 
layered histories of censorship and sanction, legitimacy and prohibition, 
remembering and forgetting, while paying attention to the conditions that 
allowed such narratives to become hegemonic. 
In order to do so, I have felt it necessary to leave Shahabag, and go 
"back" to a different time and place. The small, northern town of Saidpur 
bears the testimonies of how multiple colonial powers have, over centuries, 






continued to echo even after 1971. It’s unique, historical mix of ethnicities 
and religions presents us with the paradoxes of a "plural" community that 
has lived through multiple post-colonial nation-states, allowing us to ask 
the question—what does it mean to remain? At the same time, Saidpur 
allows us to "provincialise" the nation-state itself, and see how the state 
was met with a different kind of nation at its "margins". Methodologically, 
the intergenerational experiences of my interlocutors, belonging to both 
pre and post-Partition and post-71 settler communities (Bengali, Marwari, 
Bihari and Bahe) allowed me to explore how their memories kept 'getting 
into the way' of the nationalist history, and the violence that has followed 
after every new (re-)imagination of "the nation"—be it Pakistan or 
Bangladesh—revealing a horror story of sheer abandonment. 
Theoretically, these voices from the margin have helped me articulate 
the aftermath of such violence and the selective amnesia these histories 
have been filtered through, as well as the complex, multiple and shifting 
allegiances of the nation-state’s citizens, and the price that they have been 
paying for their allegiances all their lives. These narratives also reveal the 
material conditions of such violence, letting us see how each new articul-
ation of the nation was enabled by and in turn legitimised its own political 
economy of oppression, and thus how these genealogies of violence have 
been intrinsic to both class and nation formation. Finally, they raise the 
question of the culpability of the state, which by curating history has persis-
tently excluded its citizens with multiple allegiances as "others", thereby 
institutionalising hierarchies and the violence that sustains them. 
Shahabag: rhetoric old and new 
It all began with the verdict of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)2 on 
5 February 2013. Abdul Quader Mollah, Assistant General Secretary of 
Jamat-e-Islami (JI) was found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.3 He was accused of raping an underage girl, slaughtering a 
poet, and killing 344 people during the Liberation War. To many, the verdict 
seemed too "soft" for the crimes he had committed, propelling bloggers 
and activists to organise an immediate protest—a candle light vigil at 
Shahabag—a major intersection at the cultural heart of the capital. 
Concerned citizens raised questions about the ICT and the government’s 
intentions (Alam 2013). Messages spread like wildfire through social media. 
The non-violent nature of the demonstration drew even more people in to 
what would become the largest popular, sustained uprising in the country’s 






hanged, JI be banned from Bangladeshi politics, and all their institutions be 
boycotted. 
Most of the identified war criminals were JI leaders who had collaborated 
with the Pakistani Army in conducting genocide against their very own 
fellow citizens in 1971. The Shahabag movement was thus a direct threat 
to the JI’s very existence, and it responded by threatening to embroil the 
nation in a veritable civil war, resulting in attacks and counter-attacks in 
both the virtual and real worlds ("Dirty tricks" 2013).4 Violence crept inside 
this nonviolent movement when blogger Rajib Haider was hacked to death 
for his alleged 'atheism'.5 By no means were all of the protesters non-
believers, and many grew puzzled and wary as this new 'atheist' vs. 
'believer' emerged. As the bodies dropped and temples and pagodas 
crumbled, non-violence too began to feel impotent ("Train made to derail 
2013; "Bagerhat, Barisal" 2013).6 
For the first few days activists7 managed to keep the movement separat-
ed from mainstream national politics, by not allowing any political leaders 
to give speeches or appear at the protest site. Their position revealed a 
growing mistrust of established power structures and elites, exposing the 
incongruities and failures of traditional party-politics that is symptomatic of 
many neoliberal states (Canovan 1999; laclau 2007; Mudde 2016; Bilgrami 
2018). At the same time, however, the state apparatuses were unwilling to 
risk losing the support of this critical mass, resulting in the city-corporation 
actively providing basic amenities while Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina 
publicly endorsed the movement. 
On the other hand, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)8 Chairperson 
Khaleda Zia called it a 'fascist' uprising,9 lending critical support to their old 
ally JI at an opportune moment. Islamist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam (HI) 
resurfaced and initially received ruling-party patronage as a counter-weight 
to JI, a strategy that backfired spectacularly. The HI grand rally on 5 May, 
held to condemn the so-called 'atheist' uprising in Shahabag, transformed 
into a site where the "nation" was put through another imagining, this time 
as an "Islamic" regime. Emboldened by the BNP, Jatiya Party (JP), JI and 
Hefazat leaders called for a movement to bring down the government, a 
call that was immediately quashed through brutal state violence, celebrated 
by the secular middle-class10 as a victory for their own envisioning of the 
nation (Sabur 2013a). What began at Shahabag ended at Shapla square. 
The image of a nation is not fixed indelibly, but is constantly questioned 
and re-articulated. In the case of Bangladesh, the secular dream of the 






the imagination of the nation, found its way back ideologically and 
politically, and was reinstated both in everyday life and in the Constitution 
(Sabur 2013b). The conflict between the old and new guards in this re-
articulation of the nation was what we saw in Shahabag, a last-ditch effort 
to save the secular nation. Slogans and banners from 1971 were deployed 
to renew long-forgotten imaginaries of the nation, but this time without the 
threat of an occupying force at the gates, expanding the space for a hege-
monic Bengali nationalism to thrive. For a while, these signifiers did call 
forth huge crowds and galvanised the spirit of 1971, but this impulse soon 
crumbled, and the movement lost its context. 
All movements have their own baggage, and Shahabag was no different. 
Yet it also forced academics to scrutinise how the nation is imagined and 
performed. There were glimmers of new imaginings being forged in 
Shahabag, seen for example in the conscious replacement of male icons for 
combatant female ones. Huge murals of Jahanara Imam dominated the 
visual images in Shahabag square. The presence of the nation-state was, 
however, inevitably announced by the enormous flag waving over the 
crowd. The sheer scale of the movement forced the state to acknowledge 
its presence. By ensuring the execution of all the key war criminals11 the 
movement brought a kind of closure to some unresolved wounds of 1971. 
Shahabag began with a radical potential to rearticulate an inclusive 
nationalism. For example, their initial Bengali-chauvinistic slogans drawn 
from 1971, such as 'Ami ke? Tumi ke? Bangali, Bangali' ('Who am I? Who 
are you? Bangali, Bangali'), met with critique and soon changed into 'Ami 
ke? Tumi ke? Pahari, Bengali' ('Who am I? Who are you? Hill people, 
Bangali') (Mohaiemen 2013). While it certainly seemed leader-less, there 
were also collectives of younger activists-bloggers who tried relentlessly to 
steer clear from the "religion question" and made it explicit that the 
movement was about war criminals. At the same time, its engagement with 
the many, conflicting discourses surrounding the question of "the nation" 
metamorphosed into a narrative that validated certain visions and 
restrained others. 
1947 to 1971: nationalism revisited 
The Shahabag movement did not "fail"—it opened up a space for trans-
versal politics, enabling new articulations and possibilities. At the same 
time, the nascent desire for a "plural" nation could not disentangle itself 
from a Bengali nationalism that is sustained by a carefully "curated" history, 






the valour and sacrifice of the Liberation War in 1971, with the Partition of 
the subcontinent in 1947 serving as the mere backdrop for this "origin" 
story. Willem van Schendel points out how this nationalist history serves a 
dual purpose: 'One hand it legitimizes the Bangladesh state and, on the 
other, it challenges the hegemony of Indo-Pakistani understanding of 
modern South Asian History' (van Schendel 2009: 190). 
The selective amnesia regarding Partition that informs this story is the 
first "loophole" that I explore, without which 1971 and its multiple mean-
ings become easily reduced to the same "secular"-religious" binary that 
paralysed Shahabag, and nationalism becomes devoid of any radical 
content. At the same time, the narrative of "unending" or "double" Partition 
does not help us understand the complex political formations that led to 
the emergence of East Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, nor does it account 
for the multiple aftermaths of violence that have shaped the lives of people 
across the Subcontinent in often subtle ways, including those of gener-
ations far removed from such events (Butalia 1998, 2015). Partition set in 
motion the violent displacement of 20 million Muslims and Hindus from their 
homes, who even as they crossed the new borders to their "desired" nations 
were simply abandoned to fend for themselves, often living lives of terrible 
vulnerability (Alexander, Chatterji & Jalais 2018: 1). 
Yet long before these colossal movements, colonial rail and waterways 
ensured the migration of labourers, merchants, missionaries and admini-
strators across the Bengal delta, leading to the formation of cosmopolitan 
townships like Saidpur. This historical plurality has tended to escape nation-
alist imaginations, including both Jinnah’s 'two-nation theory' as well as 
Bengali nationalism. The gradual erasure of the memories of such 
complicated pasts has led to skewed and simplistic understandings of our 
post-colonial experiences. 
The second loophole in the story is our tendency to think of both 1947 
and 1971 in terms of either 'a macropolitical event; or as a cultural and 
personal disaster', without paying attention to the 'socioeconomic impact' 
of these events across the Subcontinent (van Schendel 2001: 393). There 
is no denial of the endless miseries faced by citizens who were forcefully 
uprooted and transplanted in the new nation-states, yet one must also not 
forget the classed nature of these refugee-movements. Despite the lack of 
a real resettlement plan, the post-Partition nation-state became the 'chief 
facilitator of their mobility, just as the colonial state had been in the past' 
(Alexander, Chatterji & Jalais 2018: 57). My own earlier work has shown 






nations. Many of my interlocutors recounted how they could exchange their 
properties in Kolkata or Murshidabad for houses in Dhaka and elsewhere; 
some were able to avail government plots allotted to them. Along with 
catastrophe, post-colonial nation formation also provided unprecedented 
opportunities for educated Muslims and facilitated the formation of a 
cosmopolitan middle class in East Pakistan, later Bangladesh (Sabur 2011). 
In less than three decades after Partition, Bangladesh was born out of 
violent upheaval and war against Pakistan. Stagnant industrial develop-
ment under the colonial regimes had meanwhile failed to produce a 
"homegrown" capitalist class. There was a vacuum among the elite, 
aggravated by the exodus of zamindars and money lenders (Islam 1997), 
while administrative growth fostered a competitive bureaucracy. The 
ensuing struggle for power found the bureaucracy emerging victorious 
(Jahangir 1986). Jahangir argues that the petty-bourgeoisie had overwhel-
mingly monopolised the state in its major apparatuses and institutions. The 
wholehearted support for the idea of Pakistan on the part of factions of the 
Bengali Muslim middle class soon began to wane in the face of Pakistani 
'internal' colonialism (Alam 1995), an antagonism that would eventually 
lead to the struggle for independence. Both Jahangir and Alam argue that 
this particular class was able to articulate the new nationalist discourse and 
become hegemonic ideologically and politically. 
Willem van Schendel, on the other hand, claims that Bangladesh was, at 
least in the early years, 'much more than a "bourgeois project", the 
outcome of middle-class movements', yet Bengali nationalism, an 'anti-
systemic political programme within the state of Pakistan' and a tool for 
radical mobilisations until 1971, soon became an ideological tool appro-
priated by the state elite (van Schendel 2001a: 113). The civil-military-
bureaucratic alliances remained in control of the political process while the 
role of the subaltern classes was increasingly limited (Ahmed 2009: 233f.). 
I have previously argued that access to tertiary education, new employ-
ment opportunities and the social networks of the civil-bureaucratic circles 
facilitated the 'confluence of capitals' that paved the way for middle-class 
dominance in Bangladesh (Sabur 2014). This is was how, in the process of 
nation-making, the Bengali Muslim middle class emerged as the "authentic" 
voice with the authority to articulate what Bangladesh meant, while their 
discursive practices shielded a hierarchy over those who lacked such 
access, and/or were seen as unauthorised and incapable of articulating 






Third, the imagination of Bangladesh was neither founded upon a "myth 
of common origin", nor upon a "religious pedigree". Rather, the Pakistani 
Government’s anti-Bengali policies forced open the possibility (and perhaps 
necessity) of Hindu-Muslim unity based on a shared language, enabling the 
Bengali identity to prevail over the Muslim (Islam 1997)—a 'Kulturnation' 
in Nira Yuval-Davis’s typology (Yuval-Davis 1997). Like all nations, 
Bangladesh was imagined through 'domestic ideologies' (McClintock 
1995)—a nation of citizens of the motherland, speaking in their mother-
tongue (Bengali), embedded in fictive kinship relations with their fellow 
citizens. It is imperative to remember that Bengali nationalism—however 
flawed it may appear now—was a response to the Pakistani internal-colo-
nialism which undergirds 1971, and which was legitimised in the name of 
Islam. 
Over the years, an unintended consequence of this celebration of 
"Bengali-ness" has been new forms of exclusion. Dina Siddiqi has argued 
that 'the inability of Bangladeshi nationalist historiography to come to terms 
with partition/ Pakistan ensures the exclusion not just of "Biharis" but of all 
other non-Bengali speaking minorities from national belonging' (Siddiqi 
2013: 152). This was also true for the adibashi or Jumma peoples of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The first act of dissent in the new nation-state 
was by the only adibashi Member of the country’s first Parliament, Mana-
bendra Larma, who vehemently opposed the imposition of "Bengali" 
(instead of "Bangladeshi") as the official national identity of all citizens of 
Bangladesh in the Constitution, declaring that the Jumma peoples 'can 
never become Bengali' (Mohaiemen 2011: 36). By the mid-1970s, Bengali 
nationalism had taken its most conservative form, deployed to protect 
vested interests and oppress the nation’s "others"—such as through the 
"creeping" displacement of the Jumma peoples by Muslim Bengali settlers 
and military occupation—destroying the possibility of an inclusive state. 
The fourth loophole I address is the problematic representation of 
women in this canonical narrative of 1971. The gendered image of the 
nation was congruent with middle-class domestic ideologies, where men 
occupied the public sphere and were iconised as the "makers" of history 
and "protectors" of the nation, which was in turn iconised as a woman, a 
mother-figure waiting to be rescued. This narrative idealises women’s 
"subservience" and "passivity", denying their active roles in all the mobile-
sations that led up to the Liberation War, from protecting Hindu families 
from communal riots in 1948, leading demonstrations during the Language 






political prisoners in 1962 (Begum 2001), protecting minorities in the 
aftermath of the bloody communal riots of 1964, to a spontaneous revolt 
against the Ayub Regime in 1969 (ibid.). Idolising the nation as mother was 
also ineffectual in actually securing any privileges for women in real life 
(Azim 2012). 
Beyond this denial of agency, the female body also became an ideological 
battleground as well as a receptacle for ethno-/genocide. Women’s bodies 
were seen as repositories of "secular" Bengali culture, with her attire (sari, 
tip) and practices (progressive cultural activities) constituting the antithesis 
to "Islamic" Pakistan, to be deployed towards reproducing the nation 
biologically and culturally. As the repositories of the "vitality" of commu-
nities, women become the targets of systematic reproductive violence 
during ethno-/genocides, inflicting "dishonour" and causing their social 
deaths (Das 2008). 
The reproduction and circulation of horrific narratives/images of the 
survivors of rape by the West Pakistani military and their local collaborators 
was thus essential for the new nation-state, used to create the myth of a 
common, violent birth. For similar reasons, narratives/images of violations 
of men (Mookherjee 2012), and violence orchestrated by Bengali men 
against Bihari (Saikia 2004) and adibashi (indigenous) women (Naher & 
Triprua 2010) are carefully combed over, as they do not fit the gendered 
and ethnic image of the nation. Some of these gendered narratives, I argue, 
have been entwined with the "secular/atheist" vs. "Islamist" tensions that 
underline the nationalist narrative, a dimension that has not been 
adequately addressed. 
It is crucial to remember that the nationalist narrative I have been 
referring to is not static, and has been curated over time to reflect the 
changing "moods" of ruling regimes. The state-sponsored project to 
document the history of Liberation War was initiated by the Muktijuddho 
Itihash Likhon O Mudran Prokolpo (Liberation War Documentation Project), 
under the Ministry of Information in January 1978. This eventually became 
the largest archive of documents on the war, covering international corres-
pondence, incidents leading up to the war and the war itself, of which only 
fifteen volumes were published between 1982-85 (Rahman 2015). Much 
later, Afsan Chowdhury (2007) explained, while putting those volumes 
together, how the space for writing an objective history was gradually 
shrinking. This was reflected in other major projects, like the Asiatic 






volumes on the History of Liberation War—based on the eleven sectors—
published by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs. 
Publications on the Liberation War began to appear in late 80s, towards 
the end of the period of autocratic regimes, because of a number shifting 
political realities. Only recently have we really witnessed a renewed interest 
in the history of 1971 that has attempted to counter the dominant, essen-
tialist narratives. Recent publications like The blood telegram (Bass 2013) 
opened up conversations regarding the Cold War geopolitics of 1971, and 
culpability of the US government. Afsan Chowdhury’s nuanced and compre-
hensive history draws on numerous reports and interviews of everyone 
from veterans to people at the nation’s margins (Chowdhury 2007). A 
critical feminist engagement has also emerged, beginning with Rising from 
the ashes: women’s narratives of 1971—a collection of narratives by/on 
women on their experiences of the war (Akhtar et al. 2012). Memory, 
sexual violence and the human cost of war have been the recurring themes 
in these new narratives (Saikia 2004; D’Costa 2011; Mookherjee 2015). 
Some of this newer work does address the loopholes I have outlined, but 
largely fail to escape the narratives of valour and violence-victimhood. 
Ananya Jahanara Kabir’s Partition’s post-amnesias attempts to punctuate 
such narratives, interweaving 1947 and 1971 with a single thread of inter-
generational memories and histories spread across the Subcontinent, 
addressing the counter-currents within the nationalist projects that have 
been forgotten 'in the process of selective nationalist remembering' (Kabir 
2013). Dina Siddiqi, on the other hand, looks at the fates of those whose 
class, religion or ethnicity were not desired as "ideal" in the new nations 
they had called their home for years, tracing the trajectories of "stranded 
Pakistanis" and urging the need for a "denationalised" history that breaks 
away from statist and teleological narratives (Siddiqi 2013). My essay 
responds to such a call. 
My ethnography on Saidpur explores the ruins of 1947 and 1971. The 
histories of the intersecting lives of the town’s Bihari, Marwari, and Bengali 
settlers—both "local" and "Ghotis" (Bengali migrants from India)—tell the 
story of how their entitlements were stripped away and they were made 
pariahs in their one "home". It is an account of absence and erasure, of an 
inaccessible non-existent archive that can only be reconstituted through 
memory. This 'negative methodology' (Navaro 2020) unpacks the mass 
violence 'through its aftermaths', drawing not only on the narratives of 
survivors, but also of those whose lives have been shaped by these events, 






us delve into the material conditions that made this displacement and mass 
violence possible. The 'magic of nationalism' does not automatically 'turn 
chance into destiny' (Anderson 1983: 7)—after all, in the Subcontinent, 
"chance" (of birth) often came to mean little as the nation itself trans-
formed—nor does the "spirit" of nationalism summon citizens to fight using 
empty promises. 
As Anderson put it: 'Nationalism is partly an effect of the totalizing and 
homogenizing projects of state formation. These projects produce an 
imagined sense of political community that conflates peoplehood, territory, 
and state' (Alonso 1994: 390). These projects, conceived as nationalism, 
manufacture the categories of "Self" and "Other", hierarchising citizens 
based on gender, class, ethnicity and religion, provisioning varying degree 
of privileges within a nation-state. The omissions of the Bengali nationalist 
narrative are neither accidental nor inevitable, but carefully curated to deny 
the multiple allegiance of non-Bengalis (Biharis, Marwaris, adibashis, relig-
ious minorities), legitimising the material conditions for the violence that 
perpetuates the destitution of these marginal groups long after Partition or 
1971. The "spirit" of nationalism does not turn neighbours into a violent 
enemy, but the promise of material gain does, a promise ensured by 
nationalist allegiance. 
Unearthing the 'violence […] at the origin of all political formations, even 
of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial' (Renan 
1990: 11), is crucial for a sincere historical and ethnographic recounting of 
the nation. Ernest Renan suggests that 'unity is always affected by means 
of brutality' (ibid.); by confronting the brutality of all actors, we are remind-
ed of the humanity of the "enemy" as well. As Talal Asad suggests, 'the 
modern state is at once one of the most brutal sources of oppression and 
a necessary means for providing common benefits to citizens' (Schneider 
& Asad 2011). It is impossible to bypass the nation today, and citizens have 
to negotiate for rights within that aegis. Such negotiations also rearticulate 
the constellations of gender, class, and ethnicity within the nation, 
revealing and rearranging who can claim the state, and especially who are 
entitled and desired by the nation. 
Many voices and multiple allegiance  
Shahabag’s limits, then, were no different from the limits of the history we 
have inherited. Needless to say, a full account of these limits is far beyond 
the scope of this article. My argument is that it is not possible to confront 






lives have lived within and through them. This is what I have attempted to 
do by leaving Shahabag for Saidpur, to look at how the nation is imagined 
and performed at its margins. 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the emergence 
of an interlocking system of colonial rail and waterways in eastern Bengal, 
connecting the major trading ports with the regions supplying labour, so 
that 'the imperial commerce of India – tea, jute and coal' could thrive 
(Alexander, Joya & Annu 2018). With the flourishing global trade of the late 
nineteenth century, a growing demand for jute led to its commercial 
production in Bengal. Railways were extended into Eastern Bengal and 
Assam, and thousands of men were recruited from India (particularly from 
Bihar) to build them. Large railway township had also sprung up around 
the locomotive workshop at Saidpur and Parbatipur (ibid.: 56f.). 'Marwari 
traders were usually the first to begin operations in towns just connected 
to railways, and dominated the jute trade in towns along the Northern 
Bengal State Railway, in Rangpur, Domar, and Haldibari' (Ali 2018: 101). 
Hence Saidpur, the small British colonial town established in 1870 
became prominent, drawing in workers from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, British 
and Bengali railway officers, merchants and traders from Marwar to Kabul, 
janitors from Orissa and Andhra Pradesh and British missionaries, as well 
as doctors for the Anglican Church. Since the Partition of 1947 this demo-
graphy has changed dramatically; before the Liberation War, 75 per cent 
of the population were Urdu-Bhojpuri speaking Biharis, reduced to only 40 
per cent now.12 Because of such a composition, Saidpur was used as the 
base by the Pakistani occupation army in north Bengal. It still remained 
ethnically diverse even after 1971.13  
Familiarity with the place and the languages (Bengali, Urdu, Bhojpuri 
Marwari, Bahe) as a child and a teenager, combined with being away for 
twenty-two years, provided me with both the proximity and subjective 
distance required of an anthropologist. I started collecting family histories 
in 1997, and revisited my interlocutors in 2014 to understand the different 
phases of migration and the complicated negotiations of everyday life. I 
have collected twenty family histories from Notun Babu Para and its 
adjacent areas in Saidpur. Some of these families are Bengali settlers who 
had migrated from West Bengal and various parts of East Bengal before 
and after 1947, most of whom retired as railway officers. My Marwari inter-
locutors have been living in Saidpur for over four generations; some of the 
rich trading families had multiple bases in Dhaka, Chittagong, Kolkata and 






My Bihari interlocutors include small traders, peddlers and educators. 
Many of them have been living in Saidpur for four generations, and two 
families moved there after the Calcutta (now Kolkata) riots of 1946. These 
were permanent residents of Saidpur, while many Biharis took the oppor-
tunity of repatriation in Pakistan, and some used illegal means and fled to 
Pakistan as muhajirs/refugees from 1974 to the 1980s.14 Their lived experi-
ences varied substantially because of their religious, class and ethnic back-
grounds, but all of them had one thing in common—they had all chosen to 
stay on in Saidpur, even after everything that happened to them in 1971. 
What made them stay, that too living with and breathing the same air as 
the enemies in apparent harmony? 
My Bengali interlocutors Firdousi Begum and Masuda Rehana Begum are 
sisters. Their parents Mir Abdul Majid and Nurjahan Begum moved to 
Saidpur for work in the early 1940s. While Majid joined the Assam-Bengal 
Railway as a sub-assistant engineer, Nurjahan completed her graduation 
and diploma in teachers training and joined the Tulshiram Girls’ High 
School. They had four children, but also raised their younger siblings and 
nephew and nieces in that house until the war broke out. Their first-born 
Masuda left for her Intermediate (11th and 12th grades) in Dhaka when 
she was 16, got involved in student politics and never really returned home 
except for big events (weddings, funerals and Eid) and regular visits. Yet 
she returned to Saidpur in March 1971 to work as an informer for her fellow 
comrade. Firdousi, on the other hand, stayed in Saidpur all her life except 
for her graduate years at Rajshahi University. Later, she joined the Canton-
ment Public School as a teacher, and was married to Masuda’s political 
friend Shamim. Shamim’s father worked in the railways and was from 
Murshidabad. Part of their extended family relocated to Bangladesh after 
the 1964 riots in India. Masuda and Firdousi both narrated their first-hand 
experiences of 1971. 
Masuda’s account reflects a deeper sense loss, and an understanding of 
the displacement that made it possible for them to own a home at some 
other’s expense. Masuda describes: 
My father was taken away by the Pakistani army at the end of April. 
We were living in the Tulshiram Girls’ School quarter at that time. 
There were very few Bengali families living, surrounded by Biharis. We 
had to get out of that place. We were taken to the police station and 
later moved to the house of the officer in charge (OC) along with other 
families under his protection. The OC was Bengali and was from 
Mymensingh, the same as our parents; but he had no choice but to 






kill-list. He was accused of being an "Awami League-er" (AL), simply 
because my mother was a presiding officer in the 1970s election and 
the AL won from that centre. So, everyone involved in the election 
was accused of being an AL supporter. 
Abba was sick when they took Tulshiram babu and others, or he would 
have been killed otherwise. Saleh Mowlana was the leader of the Peace 
Committee, yet, he opened a camp for women and children of freedom 
fighters. The OC could not provide personal protection anymore as the 
situation was getting worse, so he advised us to move to the camp as 
there would be police protection there. Since our father was in the 
torture camp, we were technically destitute. But we were fortunate to 
be treated with dignity everywhere we went. Even in the camp we 
stayed with the Mowlana’s family. We were there for 4-5 months, until 
September. 
My youngest uncle was the registrar at the Agriculture University and 
was connected to the agriculture officer in Rangpur, and he requested 
them to provide us shelter if we could escape from the camp. 
Meanwhile, my comrades managed to pass the information that they 
were about to attack the Mowlana’s house and we must escape. What 
an irony – it was the Mowlana who wrote a special letter for our safe 
passage and introduced us as his own. Personally, I must acknowledge 
our privileges even in the toughest of times. How do you deny 
kindness in mayhem? They collaborated because that was the only 
option for them to retain the Pakistan they had opted for as their 
home. 
After the war Majid reported back to his stations, was immediately rein-
stated and given accommodation in the railway quarters as recognition of 
his sacrifices during the war. Nurjahan resumed her teaching as well. Later, 
Majid and Nurjahan were allotted a plot in Notun Babu Para in 1978, the 
very year Majid died of cancer. These plots had once belonged to Biharis, 
and had been acquired by the government under the Enemy/Vested 
Property Act of 1974. Firdousi, Masuda and Nurjahan were immensely 
grateful for the roof over their head, but they were also cognisant of the 
fact that this had only been made possible by displacing a Bihari family, 
and that the war had provided the context for such ownership and 
affluence. Nurjahan emerged as the ideal "new woman" who not only 
shouldered the family burden single-handedly, but also became active in 
women’s movements and was a philanthropist until her death. She never 
forgot the kindness she had received while battling for her existence, and 
reciprocated the same regardless of ethnicity, religion or class. 
Muslim Biharis, however, have very different stories to tell. To them, 






of trouble'). One of my Bihari interlocutors, Marium Begum, was a peddler 
of saris smuggled across the Indian border. She is now in her late 70s, with 
blurry eyesight and a limp in one leg, both gifts of 1971. She had accom-
panied her husband Munawar Khan from Monghyr to Shantahaar in the 
1940s when he was posted there. They had three sons and a daughter. Her 
husband had been a police hawaladar in 1971, and had helped many 
Bengalis in the Pakistani camps, only to die along with her sons at the 
hands of their Bengali neighbours in Shantahaar. She was tortured and left 
to live a physically and socially paralyzed life. Like many Biharis from 
adjacent areas, she moved to the Saidpur camp. She never tried to return 
to her homeland in Bihar or go to Pakistan, as her loved ones were buried 
in Bangladesh. When I asked her about her feelings towards Bengalis she 
smiled and replied, 'Insaan aur Haywan hum saab me hain beta, waqt paar 
saab niqal ata hain' ('Both human and beast reside in all of us, dear; time 
unleashes them all'). She was close to our family and I have never seen 
her being unkind to anyone, nor complain of her fate. 
One of my interlocutors Azahaar remembered the events of 1971 very 
differently. Azahaar’s family had moved to Dinajpur after the Kolkata and 
Bihar riots of 1946. They were a small-trading family living in Muslim-
dominated Kidwai Street in Kolkata, although their ancestral home was in 
Bihar. After witnessing the mindless killing of Muslims, his father Atahar Ali 
left Kolkata overnight and empty-handed. They arrived in Dinajpur with his 
wife and five young children with the help of his extended family. Even-
tually, they managed to exchange their property in Kolkata and bought a 
house in Dinajpur. Half of his family still lives in Bihar and Kolkata. They 
had a deep allegiance toward the idea of Pakistan, and that allegiance 
changed everything for them in 1971. Toward the end of the war the 
counter-killing of Biharis had begun, and they experienced the same 
trauma of Partition all over again. They had chosen to move to Saidpur, 
thinking that a Bihari-majority area would be safer. They were physically 
unharmed but lost everything in the war. They had to start all over with 
the help of their community, and were never really able to make up for the 
losses of Partition or 1971. Rejecting the title of "traitor" that tends to be 
applied to all Biharis indiscriminately, Azahaar felt that it was him who had 
been betrayed, having migrated from India to Pakistan, and not having left 
Bangladesh for Pakistan. He urged the importance of including stories like 
his as part of the Bengali national narrative.  
I am made to feel like a bastard child who is abandoned by his mother 
(India) for having a different faith/religion from her, and then 






because my race/ethnicity was different from her. In my new home 
(Bangladesh) I am seen as an unwanted child, abandoned by mothers 
and having no place in society, even though I am a citizen of Bangla-
desh and my ancestral home is Saidpur. 
Dina Siddiqi (Siddiqi 2013), in her work on the 'stranded Pakistani' case, 
has suggested that they had not left the nation; rather the nation had left 
them. There are many Biharis who never even considered the offer of 
repatriation, including ambiguous figures like Saleh Mowlana. Firdousi’s 
narrative revealed that he had allied with the Pakistani army, led the local 
Peace Committee and pledged to maintain the integrity of undivided 
Pakistan. Simultaneously, however, he ran a relief camp that sheltered 
hundreds of Bengali families from atrocities. He refused to leave Saidpur 
when there was a counter-attack on Biharis, let alone opt for repatriation. 
His sons still live in Saidpur, running the Darul-ulum Madrasah (religious 
schools and boarding house). 
Yet it is not enough, as I have suggested, to simply "reverse" the sides 
in a tale of violence. Digging into the 1971 archive I came across a first-
hand account in the New York Times by Prabhu Dayal Agarwala on the 
Golahaat massacre—the mass murder of Marwaris and Hindu Biharis in 
1971. Dayal was the son of the famous businessman Tulshiram Agarwala, 
who had arrived in Saidpur in 1911 and soon became a prominent person 
establishing the Tulshiram Girls’ High School in 1914. Marwari families in 
Saidpur were extremely conservative and patriarchal, where girls were 
seemingly born to be "married off". Tulshiram set an unprecedented 
example in his community as well as in Saidpur, but his reputation made 
him and his family easy targets. His son recounts his memories of that 
time: 
I am one of the unfortunates who managed to escape from the 
massacre perpetrated on the morning of June 13th at Saidpur (Rang-
pur), a non‐Bengali Muslim majority town of North Bengal in Bangla 
Desh. I call myself unfortunate because I left behind 150 members of 
my community including my parents, brothers, sister‐in‐law, nephew 
and nieces—butchered by the goondas of the Pakistan army in 
collaboration with the non‐Bengali police. 
It all began when the hordes of Yahya Khan raided our house in the 
early hours of March 26th, 1971. At least 20 army personnel entered 
at 4 A.M. and arrested my father, Tulshiram Agarwala, at gunpoint 
and ransacked the premises. They beat all mercilessly. At about 4:45 






On June 13th at about 2 a.m. we were awakened by the guards and 
put aboard a bus in a great haste and brought into the Saidpur Railway 
Station. Our family members were also brought there. We were in-
formed by Major Zamal of Saidpur Police Station that we would be 
sent to India‐via Chilhati border. We were put aboard a train along 
with our family members totalling about 400 Marwaries, Bengalis and 
Behars (all Hindus) in four compartments under non‐Bengali police-
men and military supervision. In the early hours when it was still dark 
outside, the train started but it stopped about one mile from the 
station near a graveyard known as "Maran Kuthir". There we found 
the goondas of Saidpur armed with swords and daggers ready for 
butchering […] They told us to keep quiet as we would be executed in 
the manner prescribed by the higher authorities because bullets were 
not so cheap to be used on Kafirs and Gaddars. 
The next moment we started to jump from the train. They opened fire 
from all directions indiscriminately […] out of 80 occupants of the 
second car, twenty‐one managed to escape. We took shelter in a 
nearby village and with the help of Bengali Moslems after traveling 
125 miles on foot we crossed the border and reached India on June 
20th. (Agarwala 1971) 
Prabhu Dayal never returned to Saidpur, abandoning all their possessions. 
There were many similar cases narrated by members of the Marwari 
communities. There has been silence around the issue of the forced dis-
placement of Marwaris as well, with multiple cases where Marwari "shop-
houses" were taken over by Bihari or Bengali Muslims, or declared as 
enemy property after the war. Shamim’s close friend Kamal Prasad, for 
example, was killed in the Golahaat massacre as well, and his gaddi (shop-
house) was occupied by a Bihari Muslim and eventually turned it into a full-
fledged shop for dress materials in the bazaar. 
Jamuna Prasad Kedia’s family members had gone through similar 
experiences in 1971; him and his son were killed along with Tulshiram 
Agarwal. His son Sushil along with his wife, sister-in-law and surviving 
nephews decided to return and reclaim their home, and slowly they got 
back in business. Upon his return, Sushil maintained close family and busi-
ness ties with his Bihari-Afghani friend Aftab Ahmed. He was a father-figure 
to Aftab’s children and helped them retain their shop-house as well as their 
home after Aftab’s death. Shushil and Ferdousi were classmates, which 
eventually evolved into friendships for three generations. Yet this 
communal harmony had its expiry date. Sushil’s extended family came 
under attack in Bangladesh in response to the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
in India in 1993,15 facing the wrath of the local Bihari and Bengali Muslims. 






business in Dhaka, where they stayed for over a decade. Now he divides 
his time between India and Bangladesh for business and their shop-house 
in Saidpur is partially rented out. In spite of pledging allegiance to Bangla-
desh, the state could not protect him or provide safety in his own home. 
They were stripped of their rights as citizens just because of their religion 
and ethnicity once more. 
Memory may be an unreliable source for the recounting of an "objective" 
history, and there are huge discrepancies in how struggles are remember-
ed. Yet we must accept that both memory and history are always mediated 
and selective. If history is 'a memory fabricated according to positive 
formulas' (Barthes 2000), then I would argue that this "positivity" is shaped 
by ideology as well as lived experience. Masuda, for example, highlighted 
the role of her comrades in her account of the war, which I argue was 
guided by her allegiance to the political ideology of the Left. She was also 
removed from the everyday life of Saidpur, instead immersed in the politics 
of the Chatra Shangram Parishad (All-Party Student Action Committee) in 
Dhaka, which was an integral part of the nationalist movement. Nurjahan 
and Ferdousi on the other hand, lived their lives in Saidpur, and have 
preserved the horrific memory of violence committed by everyone 
regardless of ethnicity or religion—be it Pakistani, Bihari or Bengali. 
Everyone is complicit in war; "good" and "evil" is determined by which 
side of history we have fallen in. The social fabric my interlocutors knew 
was torn to pieces. It is difficult to imagine, without having experienced it, 
the struggle of losing family, being robbed off every possession they held 
dear, losing a home overnight, waking up to a different nation, to be 
marked as the "enemy". Language and ethnicity both worked against the 
Bihari and Marwari communities in 1971. As Masuda reminded us, the 
Bihari community held onto the idea of Pakistan as long as they could. Yet 
many were also reluctant to take sides, as they were nursing wounds still 
fresh from 1947. Partition also made their allegiance to the "Islamic" vision 
of the Pakistani state only natural; indeed, to contradict that vision would 
be seen as treason. 
That many Biharis did become accomplices to the Pakistani army is not, 
therefore surprising; at the same time, to not condemn genocide (let alone 
to take an active part in it) cannot but be seen as an unforgivable act. The 
crucial difference is that all Biharis had to pay the price for the actions of 
some, while the fact that most razakars were Bengali did not entail the 
same collective guilt. Marwaris and Hindus in general, on the other hand, 






close ties with extended family members in India also often put them in an 
ambivalent category in terms of allegiance; for Marwaris, the price was 
being robbed and brutalised by the Pakistanis, Biharis and Bengalis. 
In the face of such carnage, silence was often preserved to simply get 
on with life and unseen the realities of abandonment and violence. These 
narratives not only constitute a repository of loss and trauma, but also 
reveal the material conditions that enable such atrocities. Nationalism and 
nationalist sentiment have material value; in the face decades of exploit-
tation and massive violence, Bengali nationalism might have emerged as a 
necessary articulating principle of resistance. Yet it also carried with it the 
potential to legitimise new hierarchies, and the oppression of those who 
happened to fall on the wrong side of an ever-changing equation. Even 
though Bengalis faced the wrath of the Pakistani army, many of them 
became the beneficiaries of war too. Masuda’s narrative shows us how the 
new nation-state not only promised a new "homeland", but ensured a new 
"home" too; how the Vested Property Act not only legitimised the displace-
ment of Biharis and Marwaris, but also enabled those vacuums to be filled 
up with new "desired" citizens—Bengalis—both legally and illegally. Notun 
Babu Para and its denizens remain as testimonies of such shifts—a predom-
inantly Bihari neighbourhood had already become Bengali by the late 
1970s. 
There has also been a deafening silence on the question of sexual 
violence against women, beyond the tailored stories that fit each conflicting 
narrative. There is a hushed discussion about the brutality that happened 
to the "other" community from one’s own. It was common knowledge that 
twenty Marwari girls and newlyweds were abducted and taken to the 
Cantonment, and that both Bengali and Bihari women were raped and/or 
murdered. There are multiple cases of Marwari women suffered from Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder, triggered by the loss of their immediate family 
members. The status of women in a Marwari household was conditional on 
their husbands and male heirs. In their absence, they were neither entitled 
to the property of the husband’s family, nor had any claim on her father’s, 
essentially being reduced into nonentities. There are several cases of 
women who were raped during the war and abandoned by families. 
Rumours tell of how Mumtaz was raped and abandoned; she used to work 
as a domestic worker in the Babu Para, and was suspected to be involved 
in prostitution. She brazenly admits that that she had been a mistress to 






each other, and neither ethnicity or class posed any trepidation. Most 
importantly, she recounts, she was treated with dignity. 
It is true that women regardless of their allegiances bore the brunt of 
the war, both physically and emotionally, and were made to carry the 
burden of the nation’s (dis)honour. At the same time, we hardly hear of 
women like Nurjahan in the canonical narrative—a woman who did not need 
a "saviour", who instead took charge of the family as well as that of re-
building the community. This, I argue, is because it is not "valour" in itself, 
but only violence masquerading as valour that can feed the insatiable 
hunger of the nationalist narrative. The narratives of Bihari women raped 
by Bengali/Bihari collaborators, or Bengali women violated by their own 
men are not, therefore, part of these narratives, nor do they evoke the 
same emotions. These experiences unsettle the seamless narrative of the 
vaunted homogeneity of Bengali nationalism.  
Conclusion 
Urvashi Butalia once said: 'It is the present, our involvement in it, our wish 
to shape it to lead to the kinds of future we desire, that leads to revisit and 
re-examine the past' (Butalia 1998: 348). Shahabag was such a 
"present"—it made us believe once again in the radical possibilities of the 
"collective". At the same time, it exposed the weaknesses of a ‘democratic’ 
state that pandered to both secular and Islamist forces for legitimacy, 
neutering them both and leaving behind death on both sides. Since then, 
the ambivalence, ineptitude and abandonment has made every critical 
academic and activist ask: what led to all of this? The despair gripping many 
who had been active in Shahabag was palpable even before its demise. 
Nusrat Choudhury has called this 'the restless and energetic passion of 
despair' (Chowdhury 2019: 198), which has also engendered critique. It is 
this passion that compelled me to excavate our past, and gaze through the 
loopholes in our imaginations of the nation. 
This ethnography attempted to juxtapose the memories of the inhabit-
ants of a small, multi-ethnic/lingual, post-colonial town against the nation-
alist narrative of the Liberation War of 1971, revealing the myriad ways 
that this narrative enables and legitimises the material conditions that 
breed violence against the nation’s "others", those on the wrong side of this 
curated history. Their intersecting lives take us through the terrain of 
colonial state and class formation, the Partition of British India, before 






of violence masquerading as valour at the heart of these political form-
ations, and of the nation itself, reminding us of the human cost of war. 
They push us to see beyond the binaries of good-evil, Muktijodhdha-
Rajakar, forcing us to recognise our collective culpability. Leaving Shah-
abag for also helps us explore the possibilities and limits of a "plural" 
nation-state that recognises the multiple allegiance of its citizens, and how 
this has been articulated at the nation’s margins. 
Finally, this ethnography is an attempt to break through our obsession 
with tales of valour and write a more honest and humane narrative of the 
genealogies of our present. It is time to own up to our collective guilt, and 
recognise how we have sanctioned a curated and exclusionary history that 
continues to shape our imaginations. Without doing so, I argue, the radical 
aspirations that had birthed this nationalism will also be nothing but distant 
echoes of fallen heroes. The war criminals have been executed, and 50 
years of this nation is on the horizon. The time has come to reclaim the 
state that was paid for by blood, and hold it responsible for ensuring the 
liberty of every citizen, even the ones who had once dreamt of a different 
nation.
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